Secondly, the paper will attempt to assess the implications of the new policy for future economic development. While the new attitude towards foreign investment should be welcomed, in view of Indonesia's shortage of capital and of technical and managerial skills, and in view of persistent balance of payments difficulties, it remains to be seen whether a too liberal atti tude towards the inflow of such capital will be in line with general economic development policy in Indonesia. Logging con cessions without regard to conservation policies, for instance, may lead Indonesia in the future to imitate the unfortunate example of excessive forest denudation set by the Philippines. The same can be said of fishery concessions.
In the field of mining and estate agriculture, concessions without stipulating the desirability of local processing of the commodities pro duced and exported may lead to a perpetuation of Indonesia's position as a supplier of raw materials at a time when world prices for raw materials are generally believed to be undergo ing a long-term downward trend. As pointed out by Professor Sadli, "... candidates for investment in Indonesia should realize that they will work and live in a country that has been emancipated from a colonial past and is striving to build up a national economy that must not be made an adjunct of western business empires. Economic nationalism is an important feature in our revolution and is here to stay."2 On the other hand, a continued moratorium on mineral ex ploration and neglect of fishery and forest resources will lead Indonesia nowhere, socialism and anticolonialism not withstanding .
In view of these problems, a general review of actual developments in the implementation of foreign investment policy will be given, including an enumeration of the problems en countered by foreign investors and the likelihood of the actual inflow of foreign capital as distinct from the maximal amount granted by the permits. It should be noted that both of Indonesia's closest neighbors, the Philippines and Malaysia, which have similar economies to Indonesia's but which have a longer record of favorable attitudes towards foreign invest ment, have recently promulgated new investment incentive acts and are actively engaging in foreign investment promotion.3 Indonesia, on the other hand, has the advantage of having been virtually closed to new foreign investment projects for 2. Djakarta Report, p. 9. The attitude towards foreign investment during the period 1949 to 1966 was never consistent. A state of persistent un certainty prevailed as the continuing conflict between the recognized need for additional capital for development pur poses to supplement domestic resources and economic national ism and resentments of foreign dominance of the economy in herited from the colonial era remained unresolved.
Malaysia, The Investment Incentives
The "liberal" period between December 1949 and August 1959 was a period in which frequent changes occurred in government policy due to a rapid turnover of coalition cabinets.
During this period there were no less than eight such cabinets, some of them remaining in power for only a few months.
Politically, this period could be further subdivided into two: the period of the first four cabinets, from December 1949 to July 1953, when the government attitude was generally believed to be more "pro-western," and the period of the next four cabinets, when, in the words of John Sutter, the outlook was dominated by "less tolerant ultra-nationalist and socialist politicians."T he economic equivalent of this political conflict, while not always neatly coinciding with the political sub periods , was also felt throughout the period, causing many issues, especially with regard to foreign investment policy, to remain unresolved. and exploitation permits and the extension of expired permits. As it turned out, the Commission took eight years to deliberate and report and only in 1960 were laws regulating petroleum and other mineral explorations passed.5 The adverse effects of the prolonged moratorium between 1939 and 1963 on mineral and petroleum production and exports can only be roughly estimated.
Thus in 1951, a resolution was passed in
Another example of the detrimental effect of the continu ous conflict between opposing views can be seen in the repeated postponement of the enactment of the first foreign investment bill originally drafted in 1953. The draft bill was ultimately approved by the cabinet in June 1956, but it took another two years before it was passed by Parliament (with a few amendments), only to be repealed by President Sukarno in mid-1959.6
The first foreign investment law was very general in na ture . It recognized the needs for foreign capital and granted assurances of non-nationalization for periods of 20 or 30 years depending on the nature of the enterprise. The provisions for transfer of profits and for lightening the burden of taxation were kept vague while nationwide transportation services and other fields of endeavor remained closed to foreign enterprise. The law had little consequence in attracting foreign invest ment as the general political climate became increasingly hos tile towards foreign capital.
The period of "Guided Democracy" and "Guided Economy1 ," for mally launched by Sukarno in July 1959y was marked by relatively more stability in the government. Parliament was reorganized and reduced to a "rubber stamp" body. The cabinet was led by the president himself and was no longer responsible to parlia ment. In the field of foreign investment, more radical atti tudes were evinced but the basic dilemma continued to plague government policy. This was demonstrated by the eight-year plan for 1961-69 adopted in 1960. Muhammad Yamin, Chairman of the National Planning Council, argued against contracting foreign loans on the ground that debt service repayment was getting burdensome. He opted in favor of financing the plan through the "development of natural resources" and implicitly, in favor of foreign investment rather than loans. But since the expropriation of all Dutch interests in December 1957, there was little predisposition to accept a policy in favor of direct foreign investment. Therefore the government cautiously developed a new plan of cooperation with foreign enterprises which later became known as production-sharing contracts. The new law on the promotion of domestic capital covers both national and foreign domestic capital.
It is in many re spects more liberal than the foreign investment law and can be considered a supplement to it, as it removes certain uncertainties of the previous law. It should however be noted that in this law the word "foreign enterprise" essentially means foreign domestic enterprise as defined above.
Such foreign domestic firms, while they are to be given the same benefits as private national firms, are subject to many restrictions specifically mentioned in the law, especially re garding the length of their operation, which may be as short as ten years.
In fact, the essential aim of Articles 6 and 7 of the law is eventually to end the dominant position of foreign domestic capital in the economy, while Article 23 stipulates that such capital cannot form a joint venture with a "genuine" foreign enterprise as defined by the 1967 foreign investment law. A subtle reversal has therefore been taking place in government policy regarding foreign "domestic" capital owned predominantly by resident but foreign Chinese.
It is interesting to note that $3,5 million owned by Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent and now invested in Hong
Kong is reportedly to be invested in five crumb-rubber pro cessing plants in Indonesia. This capital will probably be considered domestic but national capital as it is owned by Indonesian citizens.
Implementation of the New Policy
The Foreign Investment Picture in 1966
As Dutch investment substantially dominated the scene up to the expropriations of 1957, the wave of take-overs of Dutch enterprises in that year had significant consequences on the economy. All Dutch enterprises were turned into state enter prises and 1957 therefore saw the birth of an important public sector in the Indonesian economy.
It is difficult to estimate the extent of such investment* partly because of differences in the method of valuation and partly because the Dutch were very reluctant to disclose the actual amount. In 1958, the Dutch Foreign Minister Luns esti mated Dutch investments taken over in 1957 at 1,200 million dollars. In the final agreement reached between the Dutch and the Indonesian governments in 1967 on compensation payments for expropriated property, the total amount which Indonesia was to pay within a thirty year period was $157 million (six hundred million guilders). The share of Dutch investments in the immediate pre-World War II period was also estimated at about two-thirds of total foreign capital. Total private investment by the Dutch at that time was estimated at $2,634 million, broken down as follows: sugar 15.2%, rubber 17.1%, other agriculture 13.3%, agricultural loan banks 10.4%, tin mining 0.4%, petroleum 19%, shipping 3.8%, railroads 5.7%, public utilities 3.8%, industry 1.9% and mis cellaneous 9.5% . 6
Capital of other countries was mainly invested in planta tions and petroleum mining. American capital was also invested in manufacturing, including a tire factory.
In the post-World War period, virtually no new private capital inflow from abroad took place with the exception of capital invested in the petroleum industry. While many com panies rehabilitated their former holdings, no new expansion programs took place. As continued uncertainty prevailed on the foreign investment scene and Dutch-Indonesian relations con tinued to deteriorate, many Dutch firms even attempted to re patriate accumulated profits and capital investments.
Generally, foreign investment was in the export-oriented industries providing raw materials for the industrial centers of the world.
Little attention was paid to investing in in dustrial projects or even in the further processing of agri cultural and mineral products.
Ironically, the Sukarno sponsored production-sharing con tracts were, by their very nature, always export-oriented and would, if allowed to develop extensively, have perpetuated IndonesiaTs position as a raw materials exporter and an importer of all kinds of consumer goods. This is because production sharing contracts provided for repayments of credits from the products exported. Aside from the contracts in the petroleum industry, four projects of this nature had started exporting in 1966, including a nickel contract with Japanese interests, a logging project, a palm-oil project and a tin-dredging project. Including other contracts signed but not in the exporting stage, total investments under production-sharing contracts, 1 6
A. S. Keller, "Netherlands Indies as a Paying Proposition,"
Far Eastern Survey (January 17, 1940). Chinese capital was included, probably accounting for the bulk of the miscellaneous category. Dutch governmental capital in tin, railroads and public utilities was substantial. outside petroleum, amounted to $47.8 million. Japan accounted for more than 50% of the total.17 1 8
These production-sharing contracts, together with oil com panies' investments to be discussed in the next section and the foreign "domestic" investment which is actually not foreign capital in the common definition of the word, constituted the only categories of foreign private capital still operating in the country by 1966.
The Problems Confronting the Foreign Investor
Judging from the quite substantial amounts of foreign capital for which investment permits were successfully applied during the years 1967 and 1968, the new investment policy of the government should be considered a promotional success. shown on Apart from the obvious promotional benefits derived from them, these meetings also provided a useful forum for discuss ing the problems faced by foreign investors. As they were at tended by high-level government officials, these discussions may prove to have been quite effective. For instance, the Business International meeting in Djakarta discussed the frequent changes in government regulations, particularly in the field of foreign trade, making it impossible for investors, especially in the manufacturing sector, to make cost calculations. The conference noted that manufacturers not tied to raw material supplies in Indonesia might find other locations to set up their plants. The conference also discussed the excessive administrative bureaucracy and the fact that procedures laid down by the cen tral government are frequently ignored by regional authorities, who in addition levy their own taxes, thereby increasing the unattractiveness of doing business in Indonesia. Moreover, the conference observed that hostile attitudes towards Chinese businessmen had resulted in a breakdown of marketing in some areas and that such discriminatory practices might in the future be turned to other non-Chinese foreigners.20
The discussion above brings us to the problem of the mo tivation of the foreign investor.
It is a well-known fact that the private capital flow to developed countries is much larger than that flowing to developing countries.21 Among the other factors, it is the sixth, or lowest ranking factor, the degree of corruption inherited from the previous hyperinflationary period, which has proved to be the most diffi cult to combat. True, corruption to a certain extent exists in most developing and in some developed countries and does not seem to be a major deterrent to the inflow of foreign capital, as evidenced by the low ranking the degree of corruption re ceived in Stanford's survey. However, because of runaway infla tion, wages and salaries in Indonesia are extremely low, even by developing countries1 standards. This, coupled with an overgrown bureaucracy which plagues the present administration and the foreign investor alike, creates problems which may make this factor important enough to deter potential investors.
Editorial on Foreign
It is important to note, for instance, that only 10 per cent of Indonesia's civil servants receive salaries above $5.00 (five dollars) a month plus a rice allowance for an average of five children.2h As a result, most provincial officials all partici pate in business, whether officially or unofficially. These officials are often in a position to retard or facilitate an investment project, regardless of arrangements made and approval granted in the capital. As noted earlier, despite national exemption laws, local governors may assess local taxes of which the foreign investor is not aware when the permit to invest is granted.
Another problem is the time involved in the establishment of a corporation. A local enterprise desirous of joining a joint enterprise with a foreign company will have to liquidate and form a new company, a procedure which may take months to accomplish.2 4 25
Now that the government's stabilization policies have shown, indications of success, a reorganization of the state apparatus coupled by significant salary increases will indirectly go a long way towards combatting corruption. But under present cir cumstances, where, as a result of prolonged and severe inflation, the widespread corruption has in most cases been caused by un realistically low salaries, repressive measures taken to combat corruption will only lead to endless charges and counter-charges, resulting in total confusion and demoralization.
Reorganization of the state apparatus is being implemented vigorously, by merging various government departments, by re allocation of civil servants to departments where there is more work to do, and by a massive lay-off of surplus civil servants. It should be noted that the civil service has grown from 420,000 24. ''The Deadwood Still Unlopped," Economist (October 19 , 1968).
Moh. Sadli, ' 'Laporan Perkembangan Penanaman Modal Asing
Sampai Achir Djuli 1968," mimeographed. in 1950 to 2.4 million at present. Many state enterprises such as Garuda Indonesian Airways and the State Shipping Line are laying off workers in large numbers. In the latter case , more than half of the total employees of the enterprise were recently discharged. It is to be hoped that the many new foreign in vestment projects will be able to absorb at least part of these workers, for they are swelling the large ranks of the unemployed.
Finally, the conference discussed the problem of high tax rates in Indonesia. While companies coming under the exemption law do not pay corporate tax during the grace period, cor porate tax rates, which are graduated from 20 to 60 per cent with the latter applicable to profits exceeding Rp. 7.5 million, were considered excessive. The high tax rates were considered necessary to insure enough revenues to the government in view of the high incidence of tax evasion. This in turn is a legacy of the past era of runaway inflation when only 250,000 people paid direct taxes out of a population of 115 million, the rest paying only indirect taxes and numerous semi-legal and illegal levies, which, however, were felt as quite substantial, as salaries of the government officials sank to incredibly low levels. While efforts to increase the tax base to about 600,000 people in 1968 has met with some success, only a thorough overhaul of the tax collection machinery and improvement in civil servants' salaries, resulting in an elimination of illegal levies, will con vince the citizenry of its obligation to pay taxes.
Sectoral Analysis of New Investment Projects
The is obtained, the minister concerned is authorized to execute the permit on behalf of the government.
Regarding the legal status of companies operating in Indonesia, the government requests such corporations to acknowl edge that its activities are governed by Indonesian laws and to appoint a registered agent and maintain a registered office in Indonesia. If operations in Indonesia are larger than the opera tions of the company in its country of origin, the company must establish a corporate body legalized under Indonesian law.27
Up to the end of September 1968, foreign investment applica tions approved according to the above procedure numbered 84, in volving a total of $342.13 million.28 This excludes foreign in vestment in banking, in petroleum and gas and the capital of returned foreign enterprises taken over under the previous regime.
It does, however, include proposed new investments for rehabilitation or expansion by such returned enterprises as Unilever ($1.5 million) and Goodyear ($13 million).
It is in teresting to note that the Dutch company Philips will undertake a joint venture involving 25 million Dutch guilders with the state enterprise Ralin which was originally established to take over the investments of Philips expropriated in 1957. Table 2 gives the sectoral composition of foreign investment projects approved up to the end of September 1968,while Table 3 shows a breakdown of these projects by country of origin and type of project. Table 3 shows the United States leading the list in terms of number of projects, followed by the Netherlands and Japan. In terms of capital committed, the United States is followed by Canada and South Korea. It is interesting to note from the table that Meanwhile, many other companies are negotiating concessions for the mining of nickel, bauxite, tin and other minerals in areas declared open for exploration. Among the most important are the negotiations going on with Alcoa of the United States, which has initialled an agreement with the government for the exploration and subsequent development of bauxite deposits in Indonesia. No specific area is mentioned in the agreement, but Alcoa will conduct a comprehensive survey involving $9.5 million and is expected to invest, if warranted by the survey, at least $100 million in the production of aluminum, including the con struction of an aluminum plant on Bangka island. Two other nickel projects, a Dutch-U.S.-Canadian and a Japanese consortium are vying for nickel contracts in the West Irian and Moluccas areas respectively. If the three nickel groups start producing, Indonesia1 s output is expected to be stepped up consider*-ably from present production of 170,602 tons in 1967, and 170,386 tons in the first eight months of 1968. This will make nickel a major new source of export earnings for Indonesia. Alcoa1s contract will also make Indonesia a significant producer of bauxite and aluminum, as at present it produces and exports only close to one million tons of unrefined bauxite a year. On the other hand, large-scale stepping up of tin production may pose problems in the light of recent export quotas and restrictions and the threat of another steep decline in tin prices. Indonesia?s tin production has steadily declined, from 18.5 thousand tons in 1961 to a low of 12.8 thousand tons in 1966. January to August 1968 production totalled 10.7 thousand tons. It is therefore very unfortunate that export quotas are being clamped on producers when Indonesia is on the verge of regaining her former position in the industry.
Forestry. The second largest sector is forestry, a relatively new industry in Indonesia.
Conspicuous among the appli cants are those coming from other Asian countries, and one single project, that of the Korea Development Company, accounts for $48.5 million of the total, as shown in Table 3 . It is signif icant that the Philippines and South Korea, themselves exporters of lumber and plywood, figure prominently among the investors. This is not surprising in view of the declining supplies in the Philippines,which also account for the intensified efforts of Japanese plywood companies to obtain Indonesian supplies. The total hardwood timber inventory of Indonesia is estimated at about 413 billion cubic feet, or more than 13 times that ofabout 95 per cent of Indonesia1s consumption of paper* hardboard and plywood is imported, the immediate future will see, judging from foreign investment projects so far approved, more emphasis on logs and lumber exports rather than the establishment of forest-based industries, both for domestic consumption and for exports.
By Plantations. This sector, together with mining traditionally the most important foreign investment sector , has so far attracted little attention from potential investors. In view of declingin raw material prices in general/ and rubber prices in particular, this should be expected, The same holds true for Malaysia. Although Malaysia still expects to expand rubber and palm-oil acreage and production consider ably, such expansion will take place in government-sponsored land-clearance projects rather than in private estates1 acreage.
Mohamad Sadli, Laporan Penanaman Modal Asing Sampai Achir
Djuli 1968, mimeographed. Tables 2, 3 Table 4 shows the distribution of investment projects by location. By far the largest number of projects are located in Djakarta, especially in manufacturing, with the rest located in Java outside Djakarta. Projects located on the other islands are in extractive industries or plantations, which of necessity must be located where they are. With regard to location, it is officially stated that the government decides the site on which the plant is located in conformity with the development plan. In the case of mining, fisheries and forestry projects, the government generally offers tracts or blocks for tender. Article 6 of the Directives on Determining Priorities grants additional exemption of taxes for one year to companies investing outside Java.
In

Foreign Investment and the Five Year Development Plan
At the end of 1968 the president officially declared the recently completed Five Year Plan to be the official basis for 34. Preliminary estimates from Bank Negara Indonesia Unit I.
Information provided by the Directorate-General of Oil and
Gas . Foreign investment is to play a major role in the plan and in fact, for almost every industry, as indicated in the second volume of the plan, estimates of expected foreign investment inflows are included.
Foreign investment is expected to con tribute mainly in three ways. It will contribute to capital formation and therefore to the financing of the plan. It will have favorable repercussions, whether directly or in directly, on the balance of payments. It will improve production techniques in the broadest sense of the word, including technologi cal, managerial and administrative skills, all of which have suffered badly during the past period of runaway inflation. While this may very well be the most important contribution of foreign investment, it is a contribution very difficult to measure quantitatively and the remaining sections of this paper will concentrate on discussing the financial and balance of payments implications of foreign investment policy.
Financing the Plan and the Scale of Priorities
The plan in its present form is essentially only a partial plan in that it does not identify macro-economic variables such as gross national product or capital formation.
instead, output targets for strategic commodities in all sectors of the economy are set and the corresponding investment program is then matched against that part of domestic and foreign resources which is more or less amenable to government control or lends itself to estimation, such as foreign investment inflow, rather than against an estimate of aggregate and sectoral savings for the whole economy. As such5the plan includes both the government sector and a significant part of expected private investment. This approach was considered necessary for the present as aggre gate data on the whole economy are lacking and the recent experi ence of runaway inflation has distorted basic economic relation ships to such an extent that presently available estimates of aggregate variables cannot be useful. As a result of prolonged inflation, capital formation as a percentage of Gross National Product, for instance, has dropped to very low levels. An un published study has estimated this ratio to vary between 6.6 and Table 5 shows the basic financial sources of the plan and the sectoral distribution of plan expenditures. The plan in vestment figure still shows the predominance of the government sector but shows also the important role to be played by private investment5 mainly private foreign investment. The private in vestment target of 266 billion rupiahs, or 18.7 per cent of total investment, is probably too low, but, as stated earlier, it does not include all private investment.
It is, of course, very dif ficult to estimate the course of private investment in the ab sence of reliable data on past experience and in the light of the major changes in economic policy and economic conditions which are still taking place.
The table also reflects the shift in government policy. While total development expenditures undertaken by the state are quite large, it is obvious that the government intends to confine itself primarily to providing social services and to concentrating on agriculture, mainly intensification of food production and infrastructural development, leaving other com modity production sectors to private, especially private foreign investment. While state enterprises are expected to continue playing a major role, especially in the field of wholesale trade and communications, such enterprises are expected to be operated on the same basis as private enterprise and cannot expect the large subsidies or special credits of the past.
Under these circumstances, the success of the plan will depend very much not only on the total amount of private foreign investment the government is able to attract, but also on its ability to channel such investment, through fiscal and regula tory measures, into the desired areas indicated by the scale of priorities of the plan.
In the scale of priorities adopted by the plan, agriculture receives the major emphasis, and the development of other sec tors is to be geared to the requirements of agriculture. The plan gives secondary priority to foreign-exchange creating and foreign-exchange savings projects and tertiary priority to develop ment of the infrastructure. Thus both export-^promoting and import-substituting industries are to be given special stress in the plan.37
By comparison, the scale of priorities adopted for the new foreign investment policy shows in essence the following order of importance: export-promotion projects, import-substitution projects and thirdly, quick-yielding projects which create employment or are beneficial because of their effect on improving production techniques.
37. REPELITA, Volume I, pp. 1-7 to 1-11. Leaving out the production of foodstuffs, which is clearly to receive emphasis in the government development budget, there remain the twin objectives of export-promoting industries and import-substituting industries which appear in both scales of priorities. The problems of which of these two should receive the main emphasis when attracting foreign investment is not easily solved. Apparently, under the "open door" policy of the past two years, when no specific directives were given as to the form of investment preferred, foreign capital has clearly shown a preference for investment in export-earning rather than in import-substituting industries.
In this field, again, the emphasis has been more on extrac tive industries, including mining, forestry and fisheries, than on exports of manufactures or the processing of raw materials. Thus the traditional foreign investment pattern, against which, historically, complaints of foreign domination and colonial patterns of development were mainly levelled, appears still to be prevailing, at least in the first two years of the new policy.
Of course, export-promotion is a very important objective in economic development, and is, in the present stage of the economy, probably more important than import-substitution. More over, even if the above pattern is not ideal, it will undoubtedly bring concrete benefits to the economy and is certainly to be preferred over the course taken during the pre-1966 period, in which neither the government nor foreign investors were exploit ing the forests and mineral resources through endless indecision and verbal semantics on the merits and demerits of passing a foreign investment law, resulting in such natural resources remaining untapped for over twenty years.
The emergence of the "traditional pattern of investment" stems directly from the foreign investment act itself which in many respects is even more liberal than that of Indonesia's closest neighbors.
In the 1956 Pioneer Industries Act of Malaysia, for instance, only manufacturing industries can qualify for "pioneer" status. This act was replaced by a new Investment Incentive Act in 1968,in which the definition was broadened to include any kind of commercial undertaking, al though industries processing commodities for export are still favored. The Philippines Investment Incentives Act, promulgated in 1967 (Republic Act 5186), was also accompanied by an Invest ment Priority Plan in which industries to be granted preferred or preferred pioneer status, including total capacities of production, were specified. Import-substitution in the Philippines had,of course,received special protection during the period before decontrol in 1962. By contrast, the Indonesian act stipulates that all foreign enterprises approved in 1967-1968 are granted pioneer status, qualifying for additional tax exemption privileges.
It is understandable that foreign enterprises in minerals and extractive industries are easier to attract than those in manufacturing. 'Nevertheless, the general trend among develop ing countries in attracting foreign investment at present is directed towards diversifying their largely raw materials based economies by the domestic processing of raw materials, the introduction of import-substituting and export-creating manufacturing industries as well as through the development of tourism. exchange regulations were drastically liberalized in October 1966, and imports of consumer goods poured in as the multiple exchange rates prevailing up till then were virtually abolished. Protection in the form of higher tariffs and favorable pre payment conditions for raw materials and capital goods imports were only gradually re-introduced in 1968. This is reflected in the composition of consumer-goods imports which will be analyzed later.
If
Balance of Payments Implications
The policy of the pre-1966 era in accepting credits while objecting to equity foreign investment has resulted, among others, in a huge external debt, amounting to $2.2 billion on June 30, 1968. A major part of this debt was contracted on unfavorable terms and was earmarked for military undertakings with negative or low economic productivity. While the government successfully rescheduled external debts falling due both in 1967 and 1968, and is expected to be able to achieve the same in 1969, this action will increase the already heavy debt service payments falling due after 1970. Average debt repayment throughout the 1970Ts is estimated to be in the order of 22-23 per cent of foreign exchange earnings.39
The impact of foreign direct investment on the balance of payments cannot be easily assessed. Trying to measure the rela tive benefits from such investments as compared to those derived from foreign credits is even more complicated. The balance of payments effect of private direct investment includes the foreign exchange earnings or savings resulting from the project itself. This is frequently not the case in foreign loan projects because of the long gestation periods of infrastructural projects for which such aid is generally given.
In the case of balance of payments program aid, which in Indonesia is sold on the so-called Bonus Export market to gen eral importers for a wide range of essential goods including certain consumer goods, debt-servicing will have to come from other foreign exchange creating sectors.
On the other hand, the direct effect of foreign investment inflow on alleviating balance of payments problems arising out of trade deficits is quite limited, as the initial foreign exchange inflow is chiefly used to import such things as machinery, drilling equipment, etc. A larger inflow than necessary, which may be deliberately contracted by the investor who is at the same time the supplier 39. REPELITA, Vol. I, p. III-22. This assumes new loans to be predominantly contracted on D.A.C. terms of 20 years matur ity, 7 years grace period and 3% interest.
of equipment, will have an adverse effect on the future balance of payments because of excessive outflow to service such in vestment .
In the present Indonesian investment policy, no guidelines as yet exist to estimate the net foreign exchange gains or sayings from a specific capital inflow in order to determine the eligibility of the project to qualify for exemptions under the law. Moreover, the law states that no restrictions will be placed on the remittance of profits. The only way to encourage the reinvestment of profits will therefore have to be through fiscal measures. In projects where the foreign exchange benefit to the country is not clear, such as in "import-intensive" importsubstitution projects (assembly plants or "packaging" industries), an unlimited transfer of profits will result in a continuous strain on the balance of payments. Table 6 presents the summary of balance of payments projec tions for the five year plan period.
It shows that private capital is expected to come in at an accelerating rate, reaching $171 million dollars by 1973/74, or three times the inflow expected in 1969-70. Judging from the present rate of approvals of applica tions for investment, the total of $571 million expected over the five year period is probably not too excessive a target, although permits to invest, as indicated earlier, should not be confused with actual investments.
Private capital inflow estimates presumably incorporate expected changes in external reserves. They also include an expected back-flow of private "domestic" capital which had been kept abroad during previous unsettled times and of proceeds from technical smuggling originating from "overprice" proceeds,40 as well as from outright smuggling.
As shown in Table 6 , the government will not solely rely on private capital investment but will still depend heavily on foreign aid throughout the plan period.
For 1968, commodity or program aid requested by Indonesia amounted to $250 million, while project loans requested total $75 million. Actual program aid received, including PL 480 aid, was $254 million, while addi tional food aid of $58 million was delivered. Thus total non project aid amounted to $304 million. Taking account of the amount carried over from 1967 of $26 million and an estimated carryover into 1969 of $32 million, actual utilization of program aid for 1968 is about $298 million, contributing substantially 40. Overprice proceeds is the foreign exchange revenue accruing to exporters resulting from the difference between prices actually obtained in foreign markets and the "checkprices" deliberately set below world prices on which export taxes and official foreign exchange earnings are calculated. This system has been in use for many years to provide added incentive to encourage exports. a. Exports include "net" oil exports, i.e., oil exports minus cost of production and other costs, and investment income accruing to foreign oil companies. It also excludes foreign exchange costs of domestic marketing and debt payments to expropriated Shell Company. The imports, services and debt repayment accounts are therefore net of oil payments.
b. Capital Account A assumes foreign debts falling due without rescheduling. Capital Account B assumes such debts to be rescheduled fully.
(See text for explanation) to the stability of rice and other prices throughout the year.
The contribution of foreign direct investment on export earnings will be more important than the inflow of the capital itself. As described earlier, the prospects for increasing ex port earnings from petroleum, forestry, fisheries and other rela tively new exports such as copper, nickel and bauxite are very good and the annual compound rate of growth of exports of 6.6 per cent suggested by Table 6 may even prove to be on the low side. Of course, a continuing decline in rubber and tin prices in world markets would lower overall export rates of growth, except if offset by really spectacular rates of growth in new exports which benefit from expanding demand trends in world trade.
The above is reflected in the plan, as rates of growth projected for different categories of exports vary widely. Dur ing the plan period, category A exports, or traditional exports, including rubber, tin-in-concentrates, copra, palm-oil, coffee and tobacco leaves and manufactured tobacco, is expected to grow at an annual rate of only 3.*+ per cent, reaching 5503 million bv 1973/74. The rate of growth for category B exports, on the other "hand, which include all other exports except oil, is expected to be 14.9 per cent annually, while petroleum exports are expected to grow by 10 ."4 per cent annually.
Imports are expected to grow very rapidly also, but their composition is expected to change significantly.
In 1969 The rapid growth of imports, estimated at an annual com pounded average rate of 12.1 per cent will outpace the rate of growth of exports. This will result in a persistent current account deficit in the balance of payments. It should be noted that Indonesia1s balance of payments between 1961 and 1966 also experienced a persistent deficit in the current account, but it is hoped that the balance of payments developments in the crucial years of the five year plan will be accompanied by an acceleration in the rate of economic growth which is the ultimate objective of development policy.
Foreign investment is expected to contribute substantially to the acceleration in the expected rate of growth. However, if sustained high rates of growth in the long run are envisaged, foreign investment should be directed more towards manufacturing, whether it is of the import-substituting or of the export processing variety. In order to foster foreign investment in these sectors, specific incentives should be provided. Moreover, exchange regulations and administrative bureaucracy should be simplified, while corporation laws and tax rates should be changed to favor such fields of endeavor. In addition, tne Technical Committee on Foreign Capital Investment should be given more power and should become a genuine Board of Invest ment empowered to approve investment applications in the field of manufacturing and services, without having to deal with the departments concerned.
It is understandable that in mining and forestry, the departments concerned should have a hand in giving approval to particular foreign investors as this concerns the wealth of the country, but such procedures applied to manufacturing and services serve little purpose and are reminiscent of the past, when as many departments as possible were involved in imposing controls and restrictions on private enterprise.
